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Abstract
A library has been designed and written in C that implements Version 1.0 of the
Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) specification. A SDSI server pro-
gram and other relevant tools, including a command line "shell" for issuing SDSI
commands, have also been written in C and make use of the library, which provides
a rich set of functions for programs that want to use SDSI.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure[10] is a simple public-key infrastruc-
ture being developed by Professors Rivest and Lampson, in response to the complexity
of proposed infrastructures like X.509[4].
In SDSI, a public key that is used to sign statements is called a principal. Any
principal can be a certificate authority, signing certificates and other objects that are
then distributed from the principal's one or more online Internet servers.
Most importantly, a principal can issue certificates that bind names locally sig-
nificant to it to other values. Together, these certificates define the principal's local
name space. When a local name is bound to another principal, also with its own
name space, the two namespaces are said to be linked. Linking namespaces in this
way allows indirect naming, and gives a public-key infrastructure that is based on the
idea of "six degrees of separation"' .
SDSI also features very flexible and readable group definitions, that can be used
to write very auditable access-control lists for objects served from SDSI servers.
A library has been designed and written in C that implements the SDSI Version
1.0 specification. An object server, and other useful tools, have also been written in
C and are based on the library.
1Thanks to Chris Tarr for making this connection. This is the idea that, if you have 20 friends,
and each of them has another 20 friends, and so on four more times, you can "reach" anyone in the
world.
1.1 The SDSI library
The SDSI library is written in C and provides a collection of functions that allow
application programs to use SDSI. Chapter 2 includes sections describing the more
complicated designs in the library, including the error handling mechanism, the mem-
ory manager, and the cache system.
1.2 The SDSI server
The SDSI object server is also written in C and makes heavy use of the SDSI li-
brary. While it acts as a server only for the "core" SDSI protocols (Get, Reconfirm,
Membership, and the added Update), it could be expanded to serve other, user-defined
SDSI protocols, or be used as the basis for another, separate server program. The
SDSI server is covered in Chapter 3.
1.3 Supporting tools
Some other support programs have been written to enable users to make good use
of SDSI, and they are discussed in Chapter 4. The most important of these tools
is a command-line shell that can be used to perform SDSI queries, sign and issue
certificates, and that also serves as the anchor point for the SDSI user interface[1].
Other tools include a utility that converts PGP[2] public key rings to signable SDSI
certificates, and PGP private key rings to SDSI principal definitions, and a utility
that rebuilds and cleans up structures based on the SDSI object cache.
Chapter 2
The SDSI Library
The SDSI library is the heart of this SDSI implementation; the SDSI server and all of
the other SDSI tools are based on it. As expected, it provides functions that embody
"high-level" SDSI ideas, like executing a Get. Query, signing an object, and checking
an object's access-control list. But the library also has sets of "low-level" functions,
and accompanying disciplines, that callers need to be aware of. A low-level side of
the library was necessary to give real form to the high-level SDSI ideas, a difficult
task when working in a practical, basic language like C.
This difficulty was a result of the fact that, even though SDSI is promoted as
a simple infrastructure, it gains much of its simplicity from its flexibility - and ulti-
mate flexibility is difficult to program for in a basic language. The main SDSI data
structure, the S-expression, is a human-readable, LISP-like list that can be of any
size. This representation, combined with a loose object syntax and flexible seman-
tics, means that SDSI objects tend to be large, complex, and actually dependent on
one another in many different ways for their full significance and meaning.
This chapter attempts to explain the problems that this flexibility caused while
designing the library, and the design decisions that were made to cope with it.
The first problem this implementation faced was that C is not as well-suited to
juggling a large number of big, complex data structures as it is to juggling a large
number of automatic variables. So, the SDSI library has a memory manager that
takes care of allocating SDSI objects, and its attentive use removes from the user the
burden of worrying about when those objects need to be destroyed.
SDSI's flexibility also means that most functions make heavy use of other functions
within the library, with some making good use of recursion, too. Because of this, being
able to effectively deal with errors at any point during execution was another problem
that led to the creation of the library's error-handling facilities, which interact a great
deal with the memory manager.
To keep SDSI network queries to a minimum, the library maintains an object
cache. Searching this object cache as efficiently as possible - especially on large
servers - while continuing to support SDSI's allowance of detached signatures was
another challenge. The idea of building cache subsets based on locality grew out of
this.
Finally, the network protocol functions, the cryptography routines, and the func-
tions that evaluate and manipulate SDSI objects needed to be general and expand-
able, to make for readable code and to provide for future needs, so parts of their
constructions are unusual and deserve discussion.
The designs of these parts of the library will be covered in the remainder of this
chapter. The general framework that the library functions work in is introduced
first, in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 discusses the memory manager and error handling
facilities, the cache manager and localities are described in Section 2.3, and object
manipulation is covered in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 is about the network protocol
support functions, and, finally, how the cryptographic side of the library works and
is built is discussed in Section 2.6.
However, these sections, which dive deep into the decisions and ideas contained in
the most important parts of the library, do not cover all of the library's code. Time
constraints prevent giving full attention to all of the more than 10,000 lines that make
up the library. The SDSI library documentation[8] includes a documented prototype
and description of each function, and, since one of the chief goals was to make the
library code[7] well-commented and readable, code fragments usually follow straight
from the English comments that precede them. This makes the library itself present
a good picture of the design of its remainder.
/* sdsiSimpleString */






Figure 2-1: The sdsiSimpleString data structure.
2.1 General library framework
To support the development of a large library, a comfortable foundation is always
needed. The most important parts of this "library framework" are the most common
data structures, used everywhere by the library. Other heavily used features of this
library's framework are the central library context, the SDSI reserved words functions
and error codes, and other abstractions.
2.1.1 Fundamental data structures
SDSI's S-expressions encourage several basic data structures, and a library usually
has other structures involved in maintaining additional abstractions. The design of
these structures is crucial because they see so much use, and they tend to reveal
interesting design choices; for example, the C data structure in this library that holds
a SDSI octet-string is called a sdsiSimpleString, and is shown in Figure 2-1.
Within this data structure, string is a pointer to a buffer of size allocatedLength
that has been allocated to hold the contents of octet-string itself. The actual length
of those contents in the buffer given by length.
The curious wordhint, when not -1, is a hint used by the reserved word testing
functions sdsi_whatword and sdsiLis_word to speed the process of determining if
a sdsiSimpleString holds a SDSI reserved word. (See Section 2.1.4 for an explanation
of SDSI reserved words.)
The remainder of this library's common data structures will not be presented in
such detail here, since their actual definitions can be found in the code[7]. Instead, just
the name of each abstraction, and English descriptions of its purpose and important
contents are given. This is done to provide some justification for the structures used
by this library, and guidance for similar decisions in other implementations. Again,
this is only a list of the library's most common data structures; others, like the
protocol state structure, are more specific to certain sections of the library, and will
be introduced elsewhere.
* The sdsiSimpleString, used to hold the smallest unit of SDSI object data,
the octet-string, has already been introduced.
* A sdsiString represents a SDSI string. A complete SDSI string is not just an
octet-string: it is an octet string that can be accompanied by a presentation
hint. A string has one pointer that points to the octet-string that is the "real"
string, and another that can point to a presentation hint (which is actually
stored as another octet-string).
* A sdsiList represents a list of SDSI S-expressions. Each instance of this data
structure works much like a list in LISP or Scheme - there is a pointer to
the head element of the list, and a pointer to the remaining sublist. This
list representation reminds one of LISP's car and cdr operations, and makes
recursing or iterating on lists very easy.
* A sdsi0bject is the actual S-expression structure, and is the main data type
used in the library. Each SDSI S-expression is either a list of S-expressions,
or a string. Accordingly, there are two pointer fields: one pointer will point
to a list, or the other will point to a string. One other field is a pointer to
the S-expression that is the object's current principal. The notion of current
principal is fully explained in Section 2.1.3.
* The SDSI library has abstractions for character stream sources and sinks, which
are kept in sdsilnputStream and sdsiOutputStream data structures, respec-
tively. These structures holds a pointer to a user-selected function that reads or
writes the characters, and additional state for the stream. Stream abstractions
are extremely valuable, and allow the object scanning and printing routines to
easily work with terminals, disk files, or network connections.
A sdsiTime structure holds a time value. Normally, the contents designate a
particular time, stored as a number of seconds and microseconds since midnight
UTC, January 1, 1970. Occasionally, this will just contain values representing
the length of a period. Time structures can also be chained together into linked
lists, which allows them to be passed "in parallel" with a list of S-expressions.
2.1.2 The library context
While performing some high-level SDSI operation, there are certain implied values
that will be significant throughout execution. For example, the public and private
keys of the principal currently in use by the caller of the library represent the current
speaker using the library. These keys are used whenever a query needs to be signed,
or an older signature checked - actions that might happen many times during the
course of executing one high-level function call.
These keys, and other values important to "coloring" an interaction with the
library, could be passed in to every function, and threaded through a call chain.
However, explicit passing makes it difficult to add new things to the set of threaded
values, adds to function call overhead, and doesn't look good.
The usual solution to this dilemma is to introduce some global variables. This
SDSI implementation does just that, collecting all user-supplied and library-internal
global items into a global data structure, called the library context. This context is
not directly manipulable except by library functions themselves; library callers must
use provided functions to manipulate the user-supplied parts of this state. The library
context contains:
* A pointer to the previous context. It is somewhat possible to reenter the library,
say, in a signal (interrupt) handler, and perform some SDSI operations. There is
a function to "enter" a new library context, and one to exit the current context;
these push and pop this stack of contexts. Since this context is global and
mutable, if the library is to ever be reentered, this ability is needed.
* The SDSI objects that are the current speaking principal's Principal: object,
his signing Private-Key:, and his decryption key (which is usually the same
as the signing key). If this speaking principal is acting as a proxy for another
principal (as a server does, when answering a query "as" one of its clients), this
other, client, principal is also stored here. These global items are frequently
referenced.
* An object in which all credentials used to complete a library call will be collected
can be put into the library context. This is especially useful during a proxy sign-
ing operation, to gather all credentials that identify the signer as a member of
the Group: of a given Delegation. Cert:. Throughout the arbitrarily complex
group-membership check, all credentials that were needed to satisfy the check
can be collected so that they may be included, with the Delegation.c ert:, in
the signature, relieving the need for the signature code to separately discover
the required set of credentials.
* A list of the speaking principal's local clients is stored here, as a hint. When
present, it identifies those principals that the speaking principal serves for - i.e.,
any principals that this principal would be willing to answer queries directed
to. This is kept as a global hint as a performance gain for servers, who very
often need to check principals against their client lists.
* This context's current execution frame. This is a number that corresponds
roughly to the current depth of the library call stack, and is used by the error
handling facilities and memory manager to correctly scope heap objects. See
Section 2.2 for more information on memory management and error handling.
* A pointer to a set of continuation buffers, and a pointer to the member of
that set currently in use. A continuation captures a point of execution; these
( Cert:
( Local-Name: head-nurse )
( Value: ( ref: Mass-General head-nurse ) )
( Description: "The current head nurse at Mass General Hospital." )
( Signed:
( Signer: ( Principal: ( Public-Key:
( RSA-with-SHA1:
( N: =Gt802Tbz9HKm067= )
(E: #11 ) ) ) ) )
Figure 2-2: A certificate that demonstrates the idea of current principal.
continuation buffers are the most important part of the error handling facilities,
discussed in Section 2.2.
* Two structures, that hold the global state of the heap and cache managers.
2.1.3 Objects' current principals
A slightly nonobvious but important SDSI idea is that of an object's current principal.
This can be thought of as an attribute of every object and subobject - right down
to strings - that indicates the principal that "spoke" it. Normally, when looking at
an entire, top-level SDSI object, it is obvious to a human viewer how the different
parts of the object are signed, and hence "spoken", by different principals. But this
essential information is lost when program functions descend into subobjects unless
those subobjects are explicitly tagged with it.
For a simple example, see the certificate in Figure 2-2. When viewed as a whole, it
is obvious that ( ref : Mass-General head-nurse ) was spoken by the Principal:
given in the Signed:, and that this principal is the one that needs to be contacted
first when resolving the ref: (to get a value for Mass-General).
But, when nested function calls start working on subobjects of this certificate,
if one of them is given the ref: subobject and needs to resolve it, where does this
initial, or current, principal information come from? Unless it has somehow been
passed down through the function calls to the ref :-resolver, the resolution cannot
proceed.
In this implementation, before any SDSI object that is received over the network
or read out of the cache is handled, it has its current principal "set" throughout.
What this means is that the object is descended into, and each subobject, right down
to the individual strings, is tagged with a pointer to the SDSI Principal: object
that spoke it, according to the following loosely stated rules:
* If this subobject is a Signed:, the principal named in its Signer: field is this
subobject's current principal.
* If this subobject has an appendix mode signature, the principal named in its
Signer: field is this subobject's current principal.
* Otherwise, this subobject's current principal is the same as its parent object's
current principal.
Because this is done, all instances of SDSI objects inside the library carry this
extra information of who spoke them, which is invaluable where the need for such in-
formation is basically implied - as is done in the convenient, simple SDSI constructions
like ref :s and Group: definitions.
2.1.4 Reserved words
The SDSI specification introduces the core SDSI object types, and in doing so implies
a set of reserved words, like Cert:, Group:, and ref:. These reserved words are
necessarily referred to a great deal throughout any library's implementation.
To prevent having to type the actual text of a reserved word each time it is
needed in some octet-string (and in the process, risk misspelling it), and to aid in
determining which, if any, reserved word a given octet-string already holds, this library
implementation has a numerically indexed set of reserved word octet-strings, and a
group of functions that map back and forth between indices and equivalent octet-
strings.
The reserved word set is built automatically during the library build process, and
the values that index the set are available as C preprocessor symbols. This way,
when a reserved word octet-string is needed or tested, a preprocessor symbol is used
instead of a literal string value - which means that typing mistakes will be caught by
the compiler as "unknown symbol" errors.
A small optimization in the reserved word system consists of a "hint" that is left
behind in the data structure of an octet-string found to contain an indexed reserved
word: the index value is left there as a first guess to speed future calls to map the
octet-string to a reserved word index value.
2.1.5 Error codes
Many possible errors can be encountered during the execution of a SDSI operation.
These errors, and the no-error case, are distinguished by different error codes.
In this implementation, most functions return an error code as their value. The
last called function's error code is also always returned in a global variable, which is
available to both the library and its external callers.
Similar to the reserved word index set, these error codes are also indexes into an
array of English strings that attempt to explain the error. This table of strings is
built automatically during the library build process, and the error codes that index
the set are available as C preprocessor symbols. Whenever the library encounters an
error condition, or the library or a caller need to check for a previous error condition,
the current error code becomes or is checked against one of these symbols.
2.1.6 Principal definitions
A SDSI principal is fully defined by a pair of S-expressions: the principal's Principal:
object, which contains his public key, and the corresponding Private-Key: object.
These two items need to be stored and accessed together, and are called a principal
definition by this library.
Principal definitions are stored in files, and one is read into the library when
( Principal-Definition:
( Public:
( ( Principal: ( Public-Key: ( RSA-with-SHA1:
( N: #B8D1C7A2 ... )
( E: #11 ) ) )
( Server-At: oak.lcs.mit.edu spruce.lcs.mit.edu ) ) ) )
( Private:
( Encrypted:
( Key-Hash: ( SHA1 #A2AA889BB4CC35A3A9563C20D4FADFAD411A8C38887 ) )
( Ciphertext:
#3B843578F73ED7B65FECCDC1DF1 ... ) ) ) )
Figure 2-3: An example principal definition.
directed to become the current "speaking principal" in the library context. Because
these definitions are stored on disk, and have a sensitive component (the private key),
definitions are split into a public section, which is stored as plaintext, and a private
section, which is stored encrypted. Currently, the only members of these two sections
are the Principal: and Private-Key: objects, respectively.
The private section is encrypted, or sealed, in a passphrase, much like private
keyring data is sealed in PGP[2]. A passphrase is turned into an IDEA[5] key us-
ing MD5[9], which is then used by the library to unseal the private section of the
definition.
Figure 2-3 shows an example of a principal definition as it is stored on disk. Every
principal in SDSI, whether it represents a human, a server, or something else, has
a principal definition. When starting the SDSI server, or the SDSI shell or user
interface, one of these principals is loaded by the library. The actual file containing
the principal definition to be used can be specified in a library call, or by values
contained in runtime environment variables.
2.1.7 Files
Occasionally, a SDSI library or application needs to be able to find files or directories
in permanent storage. For example, a call to load a principal definition does not
always specify the explicit pathname to the principal definition file, nor should it
have to - a user has his favorite principal definition file somewhere, and he usually
means that one. Similarly, cache search function calls should not have to specify the
location of the cache directory - it should also be implied some way.
In traditional Unix applications and libraries, the pathname of a needed filesystem
element that has not been specified for the operation in progress, but that can be
implied, is implied in one of two ways:
1. Runtime environment variables can be present that yield the pathname.
2. A fallback pathname that has been hard-coded into the application or library
can be used.
This SDSI library follows this model. For example, the favorite directories of the
library, like the object cache and localities directories (described in Section 2.3), can
be named in specific environment variables (SDSI_CACHEDIR and SDSILOCALITIES_
DIR, actually). If they are not present, these directories are searched for under the
directory named in any current value of the environment variable SDSIDIR, then
under the user's home directory. As a last resort, the library will search for them
under a hard-coded, Unix-centric /var/sdsi.
Other SDSI implementations should follow this model. The ability of a single
environment like SDSI.DIR to locate all SDSI filesystem items a library or application
needs, with per-item overrides as needed, is very useful.
2.2 Memory management and error handling
Any SDSI implementation will depend on good complex object support and good
error handling, provided either by the programming language, or by the library itself,
for the following reasons:
1. SDSI objects tend to be complex and big, so space for them usually has to be
allocated out of dynamic (heap) memory.
2. Whenever space for something is allocated from a heap, that space must be
freed as soon as that something cannot be referenced again - otherwise, the
resulting "memory leaks" will eventually reduce the free heap space to zero.
3. Most SDSI library functions will return and accept SDSI objects, and place
many library calls themselves. This means that most function bodies will deal
with a lot of objects during the course of their execution.
4. Because SDSI library functions do call other functions so routinely, long call
chains are common.
The third and fourth reasons are the most important of all. The sheer number of
objects that most functions traffic in means a large number of objects can potentially
go "out of scope", or become unreferenceable, during execution, and must be freed to
prevent memory leaks. Long call chains makes the ability to gracefully handle "deep"
unrecoverable errors essential.
Some languages address these issues for the programmer (Scheme and C++ come
to mind). However, native C provides the programmer no unconscious mechanisms
for deallocating objects that have gone out-of-scope, or for handling sensitive data
(that needs to be zeroed out when appropriate), or for aborting a call chain, and this
was recognized early in the design of this library.
Given this, there were several possible solutions. For memory management, either
the function bodies could explicitly deallocate objects just before they fell out-of-
scope, or an unconscious mechanism for deallocating objects that are out-of-scope
could be developed. The latter, the development of a garbage collector, was chosen
for three reasons:
1. Explicit deallocation calls would clutter the library code, and at times even
cloud a code fragment's intent. These calls are unnecessary with a garbage
collector.
2. Every time a subtle scoping change is made, or a new function call is added, all
explicit deallocation calls have to be checked for completeness and correctness.
3. Garbage collection can handle unusual program flow control (as will be intro-
duced with the error handling facilities), but explicit deallocation calls can be
missed if unexpected non-local jumps can happen.
Strangely similar to the deallocation choices, there were two possibilities for com-
prehensive error handling. Either every function call within the library could be
wrapped with error-checking code that would explicitly return and propagate errors
back up a call chain, terminating it, or a more unconscious mechanism, a la C++,
where errors are "thrown" automatically to the top of a call chain and "caught",
could be created.
It was chosen to build such an error throwing mechanism, because all of the
explicit error-checking tests and returns would have cluttered the library code even
more than deallocation calls would have. Not having to worry about checking for
error reports from a code fragment's function calls makes those fragments much more
readable, without sacrificing the ability to handle those errors somewhere.
These two decisions, to develop a garbage collecting memory manager and a
catch-and-throw error handling mechanism, resulted in two systems that are very
intertwined. Both are involved in scopes and flow control - the garbage collector
needs information about which functions have exited or have been aborted to deter-
mine which objects on the heap are garbage, and this is information that only the
catch-and-throw code can provide.
These remaining sections discuss these two systems in more detail.
2.2.1 Global state
The memory manager and error mechanism both keep global state, some of it shared,
in the library context:
* The memory manager keeps in the library context a pointer to the head of a
linked list of all of the individual blocks that have been allocated on the heap.
A block is a single buffer of storage.
* In the library context, a value is stored that represents the context's current
execution frame. The memory manager uses this value to represent the cur-
rent allocation scope, and all newly allocated objects are made members of
this scope. This value is updated by the catch-and-throw error mechanism,
whenever a library function begins execution, finishes, or throws an error. This
value can also be artificially incremented and decremented by the library, or by
applications, wherever new allocation scopes are desired.
* The error mechanism keeps a set of continuation buffers in the library context.
Saving a continuation means capturing the current point of execution, and call-
ing a saved continuation means resuming execution exactly from that captured
point - the entire machine state is restored from the information stored in the
continuation. These continuation buffers make possible the non-local jumps
that throwing an error requires. For each active "catch" point, one of these
buffers is filled, so a thrown error will cause execution to resume at that catch
point.
2.2.2 Prologue and epilogue macros
Since both are so concerned with function entry and exit, the memory manager and
error mechanism each have code that must be executed at every function entry and
exit point. On entry, the heap manager has to start a new allocation scope, and
the error handling mechanism must save the current continuation, if this call is being
made from a catch point. On exit, the heap manager has to close the allocation scope,
and the error handling mechanism must release a saved continuation, if the exit point
is also a catch point.
Macros called the prologue and epilogue macros exist for this, and they are used at
all function entry and exit points. The use of macros makes it possible to change the
necessary prologue and epilogue code in one central place, without having to actually
change code in every function.
While these macros are used whenever a function begins or ends execution, they
do not impose a significant speed penalty on the library. The extra work involved in
calling and receiving control back from a library function is normally no more than
eight simple operations, made up of just increments, decrements and assignments of
memory locations. Only when a call into the library is made from the application, is
the additional work of saving of the current continuation performed.
2.2.3 Memory management
Many points about how the memory manager is implemented, and how dynamic
memory actually works within the SDSI library are important - they indicate how
applications using the library should operate when it comes to managing objects that
live on the heap.
These points go into great detail about how the heap is operated. They do not dis-
cuss the decision-making process that yielded these details, however, as that process
consisted mostly of trial-and-error until something that worked was obtained.
Definitions of much of the terminology used below can be found in [6].
* A heap block is an individually allocated buffer, meant to hold a single C struc-
ture.
* Heap blocks are allocated one at a time, and a sorted linked list of all currently
allocated blocks is kept, with the most recently allocated block at the front of
the list.
* A heap object spans many heap blocks. For a simple example, if two C structures
are on the heap (in two distinct heap blocks) and the first includes a pointer
to the second, the two blocks together make a heap object. The first block is
called the parent heap block, and the second is its only child heap block.
Information about a heap object is found in its heap object description, which is
kept with the parent block. Part of this description is the set of locations within
the parent block of its pointers to its child blocks. This provides the reachability
information that the memory manager needs in order to walk complex objects
on the heap during garbage collection. Every SDSI C data structure that lives
on the heap and has pointers to other C data structures on the heap, makes a
heap object, and so has a corresponding heap object description.
* Every heap block is a member of some allocation scope, or frame. Frames are
nested inside each other. Once the frame that a heap block is a member of has
closed, the block becomes garbage and is eligible to be collected.
* When comparing two possible frames, the least, or better one, is the one that
contains the other in the nesting order - in other words, the better of two frames
is the one that opened first, and will close last.
* When a new heap block is first allocated, it is a member of the allocation frame
that is current. The current allocation frame corresponds roughly to the library
function currently being executed.
* A heap block can be promoted to the frame enclosing the current allocation
frame in the nesting order, thus preventing it from being made eligible for
collection when the current allocation frame closes.
* Alternately, if a heap block is a member of a heap object, and one of its ances-
tor blocks is a member of a frame that encloses the current allocation frame,
the former block will also be spared from garbage collection when the current
allocation frame closes - it inherits membership in its ancestor's frame.
So, block promotion, plus the inheritance feature, allows heap objects to live
beyond a soon-to-close frame. This behavior is used by library functions to
return S-expressions to their callers that will not be immediately eligible for
garbage collection, without having to explicitly promote every block in the heap
object.
* For efficiency, the following discipline is used to great advantage in the SDSI
library: in general, any heap-based object that is passed as an argument to
or returned as a value from a library function is always considered read-only.
This allows for the sharing of large subobjects on the heap between completely
different objects at use within the library. The resulting savings in duplication
time and heap space from the use of this discipline is enormous.
* When a shared heap-based object does need to be modified, it can be locked,
which sufficiently duplicates the object for modification by only copying the top
of the object. The top of a heap-based object is defined as the parent block of
the object, plus the tops of any children blocks also designated to be locked in
the parent's object description .
* Heap blocks that are allocated or promoted to the outermost enclosing frame
are never eligible for garbage collection, since this best frame (frame zero) never
closes. These blocks, and any heap-based objects these blocks are the parents
of, are called immortal objects within the library, because they never die.
* Part of a heap object description is a pointer to an optional function that will be
called right before the parent heap block is destroyed by the garbage collector.
This can be used to release other, non-heap resources contained in the heap
block about to be destroyed.
* The order in which the parent and children of a heap object are destroyed by
the garbage collector is unspecified.
* Every block in the allocated blocks list always indicates the least allocation
frame that was not closed the last time the block was at the head of the blocks
list - this is called the greatest living frame at that point in the blocks list.
* All of the greatest living frame values on the blocks list are interpreted as a
monotonically decreasing lower bound on the allocation frame that, for the
remainder of the blocks list, has not closed yet.
* The garbage collector itself is technically characterized as a mostly-precise mark-
and-sweep garbage collector[6]. To be mostly-precise means a garbage collector
'The need for the idea of an object's top is best seen by the top-description of a sdsiList.
... permits a mixture of precisely and conservatively identified val-
ues. For example, values in registers and on the stack might be treated
conservatively, but objects on the heap would be fully described and
precisely scanned.
This describes the SDSI garbage collector very well. The pointers that may be in
register values and stack locations tied to allocation frames that have not closed
are ignored (and are thus treated conservatively), while the garbage collector
relies completely on its knowledge of which allocation frames have closed, and
the exact descriptions it has of the objects it finds that were associated with it,
to collect dead blocks.
The garbage collector marks all blocks that are members, no matter how in-
directly through parents, of allocation frames that have not closed. Then, it
sweeps over all blocks again, destroying and releasing all blocks that have not
been so marked.
2.2.4 Error catching and throwing
The use of the error handling mechanism mostly centers around deciding where errors
will be caught, and where they will be thrown. The latter decisions are easy to make
- any time a library function encounters an unexpected condition that forbids sensible
continuation of its execution, it throws an error.
A macro is provided to make this easy: it takes a SDSI error code, and a printf
argument body (which displays any provided message, if library debugging is turned
on), and throws the error back to the most recent catch point.
The former decisions are somewhat more difficult to make. Normally, when a
library function calls another library function, and it encounters an error, that error
also prevents the sensible continuation of the first function's execution. So, most
library calls never catch errors from the function calls they make.
Occasionally, however, a library function does have strategies for continuing when
something it tries to do fails. When this is the case, there is a macro that it can wrap
an individual function call in, to catch any errors it signals. This macro is based on
two functions that can be used to explicitly turn "downstream" error catching on and
off within a library function.
These functions manipulate the set of error continuations in the library context,
using one for every active catch point.
The error code of the last error thrown is always left in a global variable, available
to the library and to callers.
2.3 Cache management
An S-expression cache is useful when working with SDSI, for storing certificates and
other SDSI objects generated locally, along with objects received as responses to
network queries. A cache prevents repeated queries of network servers, which are
assumed to be busy enough already, and, in any case, gives faster response time than
a network query could.
The general functionality that a SDSI object cache manager must provide is:
* A cache that is kept in permanent storage.
* Functions to add or remove an object from the cache.
* A search capability, that, given a SDSI template, finds all objects and subobjects
in the cache that match it.
This last piece of functionality, the search behavior, is necessary to tolerate all of
the flexibility that SDSI objects can exhibit. If a search is executed looking for all
Cert: objects, matching objects might be found quite literally anywhere inside the
objects in a cache - since SDSI places very few limits on where objects of given types
can appear.
Another good piece of functionality a library's cache manager could provide is a
cache kept in temporary storage, in memory. This cache would be considered part
of the regular permanent cache for the purposes of searching, but its elements would
not live beyond the process' lifetime. This allows objects that only need to be found
in cache searches for a short time to avoid being stored on disk.
All of this functionality is provided in this implementation's cache manager. Ob-
jects in the permanent cache are stored as files on disk, and the temporary cache
is a linked list of objects kept on the heap (made immortal so they would never be
destroyed by the garbage collector). A recursive search into all of these objects with
the given template is done to satisfy a search requests.
However, once the library was relatively finished, and testing began, it became
clear very quickly that this brute-force search over every last piece of data in the
cache was inefficient. This was especially obvious when the cache was searched for
objects and their signatures. One full pass over the cache was needed to pick up the
objects, followed by a second full pass to pick up the relevant signatures. Even worse,
if a signature had reached the end of its validity period, a third full pass over the
cache was needed to check for a reconfirming signature.
On a server, all of these full passes over a modestly sized cache would drive query
service time into the realm of a minute or more, and this was certainly unacceptable.
A solution was needed.
2.3.1 Localities
The solution came with the realization that most cache searches are executed to look
for objects with a specific locality in mind. Locality is (perhaps somewhat poorly by
Webster's Seventh Dictionary) defined as "a particular spot, situation, or location."
The following concepts of locality are not specific to this implementation at all - any
SDSI library design should make some use of these ideas.
For example, when searching a cache for objects to satisfy a particular Get. Query,
besides the search template given in the Template: field of the query, there is another
piece of information relevant to the search: the only objects in the cache of real interest
are those that have been signed by the principal named in the To: field of the query.
This means that the search can be limited to a subset of the objects in the cache
- the subset defined by those objects that share the locality of having been signed by
that particular principal. If this set of objects can be found quickly, only they would
have to be matched against the template, and only at their top level, since unsigned
inner objects, even if they did match the template, aren't of interest.
The Get. Query example identified one class of locality within a SDSI object cache:
all objects signed by a particular principal P form a locality. In fact, all objects signed
by other principals P' also form localities. All of these localities are of a certain type:
they are all speaker localities - a locality that is the subset of all cache elements signed
by a given speaker.
Speaker localities work very well for limiting cache searches to those objects that
are of interest to a Get. Query, but they are not necessarily useful for all cache
searches. Other locality types emerge from other searching patterns that are used
on the cache:
* An object locality is the collection of signatures on a specific SDSI object. This
is used to get the list of signers of a particular object.
* A key locality is the collection of all keys of a particular high-level type (public,
private, and shared-secret). These localities are extremely useful for finding the
key that matches a particular Key-Hash:.
* Signed: localities are very specific to signature reconfirmation. One of these
localities consists of a particular Signed: and all of the other Signed:s that
name that same Object-Hash:, plus all of the Signed:s that sign any of them.
This gives the signature reconfirmation code quick access to the signature ob-
jects that could be either new signatures on an original object, or signatures on
a signature on the original object.
This SDSI library's cache manager can have locality support compiled into it.
When a locality applies to an impending cache search, to be made by the library
itself or by an application, the cache manager can be advised of it. (But, because
actual locality support is an optional part of the cache manager, it should not be
assumed that objects returned by a locality-advised search necessarily satisfy the
requested locality.)
The actual localities take the form of separate files, one per specific locality, that
contain all of the objects from the cache that make up the applicable subset. For
maximum speed, the most recently used locality files are themselves cached in memory
by the cache manager. Since localities can be large, this memory caching leads to a
process-size issue, especially on servers, and this is discussed in Section 3.3.
Additionally, all localities, of all types, can only be built by running an exter-
nal program, sdsi-rebuild-cleanup. This is one of the support tools discussed in
Chapter 4. Building localities is a rather consuming task, which is why an external
program, and not the library, does it - the library only uses them. How often localities
are rebuilt is left to the discretion of any user or server administrator that has a SDSI
cache to manage, and wants to use localities to speed searches up.
However, because localities are not built (or even updated) by the library, this
means that new objects placed in the cache by the library will not be made part of
the localities until the next rebuild. Since localities exist to remove the need to search
the actual objects of the cache, when they are not complete, how the library should
treat the cache objects not represented in them is another question.
To compensate for this, this library (as should any other implementation that
uses localities, but doesn't constantly update them) allows the application to specify
one of three cache searching behaviors, which apply only when there are incomplete
localities (i.e., when there are objects in the cache that are younger than the localities,
and therefore cannot be represented in them):
* The coarse search behavior forces the cache manager to completely ignore cache
objects not represented in the localities. Cache searches are done exclusively
using the localities.
* The normal search behavior searches the localities as normal, and performs a
full sweep of only those cache objects not represented in the localities. This
can miss some new detached-signature associations, but will pick up most new
relevant objects, at a slight speed cost, until the localities are next rebuilt.
* The exhaustive search behavior ignores localities completely, and performs full
cache sweeps as if there were no localities. This always guarantees that all
detached-signature associations will be correctly made, although it imposes a
significant speed penalty because of the full cache sweeps.
These choices are extremely relevant to the SDSI server program developed from
this implementation. The decision of how often to rebuild localities from a server's
cache, combined with the choice of its incomplete-locality search behavior, determine
a server's performance. Notes on operating one of these SDSI servers can be found
in Chapter 3.
2.4 Object evaluation and manipulation
The S-expression data structure will be the most common data structure in any SDSI
library. In some sense, SDSI libraries and applications do nothing except understand
existing S-expressions, and build new ones2 . A little more specifically, the most basic
object manipulations identified as typical are:
* Given a SDSI object, find the single subobject that is the value of a particular
attribute within the object. An example of this is finding the value of the Date:
attribute of a Signed: object. This is the dominant operation a library needs
to perform on finished objects.
* Attempt to match a template to a SDSI object. This directly refers to what
needs to be done to match a Get. Query's Template: template to candidate
signed objects.
* Evaluate a SDSI object to its truer "meaning", by removing all wrap-
ping constructs and by transforming or resolving it as necessary. Exam-
ples of SDSI wrapping constructs are the wrapped-object Signed: form, and
2This is similar in feel to how addition takes two numbers and makes a third. The idea of
everything being information passing through filters and coming out as new information is fascinating
- complexity can be found in information, or its filters. SDSI puts complexity its information, which
is as it should be - addition does the same, and addition is not only very powerful (thanks to the
large set of numbers you can make to use with it), but it is also secure.
/* construct a template that looks like:
( Delegation-Cert:
( Template: ( ,messagetype ) )
( Group: ))
ADDOBJ(objl = ADD(NULL, SDSIWORDTEMPLATE), ADDSS(NULL, messagetype));
ADD0OBJ(template = ADD(NULL, SDSIWORDDELEGATIONCERT), obj );
ADD_OBJ(template, ADD(NULL, SDSI.WORDGROUP));
Figure 2-4: An object-building example.
Assert-Hash:. Object types that can be transformed are the Encrypted:, and
Encrypted-Macro: types, and ref: objects are resolved.
* Add an octet-string, a list, or another object to a SDSI object, so that new
objects can be built for transmission or storage.
Without this functionality squarely in place with an easy-to-understand interface,
any SDSI code would be difficult to read and debug.
Evaluating SDSI objects is, at this topmost level, the simplest task in this group.
Whenever an object needs to be evaluated, if it is a wrapped-object Signed: or an
object wrapped in an Assert-Hash:, the wrapping is removed. If it is an encrypted
object, it is decrypted, and if it is a ref :, it is resolved into its value. As many of
these transformations as possible are made, until the object has been fully evaluated.
Next, it is very important that the functions that add to SDSI objects are easy to
use. An intuitive interface for these functions in this library was eventually developed;
each of the functions that adds an octet-string, a list, or an object to a destination
object, takes the item to be added and a pointer to the destination object. If no
destination object is provided, a new one is started. The item is then added to the
destination object, and the destination object is returned as the function's value.
The utility and importance of this specific interface is better seen in an example
of its use. Creating the same object that the code fragment in Figure 2-4 does, by
instead referencing data structure members and allocating memory explicitly, would
be a great jumble of function calls and C indirection.
Using the octet-string stored in messagetype, this code completely constructs
the complex template object described in the comment and leaves a pointer to it in
template. (The ADD_ symbols are preprocessor macros that simply take the place of
longer function names, and the ADD macro adds a reserved word, represented here as
a preprocessor symbol, to an object.) These object-building functions were deemed
absolutely necessary for writing this library in C; functions with a similar interface
should be considered in any other language without serious object support.
Another important decision in this library was to make the template matching
function very general and powerful. This function does more than merely make sure
that an object matches a template (although it can be used to do only that); it
is normally used to impress a template upon an object. This returns a new object,
similar to the original one passed in, but with elements ordered according to the order
of the elements of the search template. This returned object is called an impressed
object.
The real generality and power of this impressing operation is this: while the
elements of impressed objects are always ordered according to the template used to
impress them, they are not necessarily elements from the original object passed in
with the template. If the original object completely fails to match the template, it
is usually assumed that it is a wrapped or transformed object, and that the result
of evaluating it might match the template. So, objects that a template completely
"misses", but that can evaluate to a different form, are evaluated and checked against
the template, repeatedly, until some matching is achieved, or until no more evaluation
is possible.
This "evaluating before admitting failure" is what makes it possible to successfully
impress complex templates onto objects without having to worry if they are, in whole
or in part, composed of ciphertexts, ref :s, or other object types that are usually
evaluated for their meaning. Since most of the time, templates are constructed to
match and find the parts of an object's true meaning, this behavior makes good
sense. However, occasionally this and other template-matching behaviors will need
to be disabled, and in this implementation they can be, on a per-call basis.
Last, because it was easiest, the functions that search for a particular attribute's
value within an object were simply built on top of the template impressing function.
In other words, all they do is construct a simple template designed to single out the
desired attribute in the provided object, and impress that template on the target
object. The resulting impressed object then contains the desired attribute value.
While this was the easiest and clearest approach, and it allows those functions to
leverage off of the intelligence of the template matcher, their performance is probably
not as good as it could be. Since finding an attribute's value is such a common
operation, and the whole template impressing mechanism is really overkill for what
it needs, functions to do this should be specially written for speed.
2.5 Protocol primitives
SDSI is a very online infrastructure, within which parties are supposed to meet and ex-
change information using various protocols. The SDSI specification defines three stan-
dard protocols that anchor the infrastructure: the Get, Reconfirm, and Membership
protocols. These three protocols make certificate and membership information dis-
tribution possible.
However, these protocols only yield a minimal infrastructure, and not one that can
necessarily do anything interesting. Additional protocols would increase the amount
of expression possible in SDSI, and the specification notes:
Each protocol defines standard message types and patterns of inter-
action. A typical protocol might be a query/response protocol wherein
the client asks a server for some information. Although we only define a
few protocols in this paper, a SDSI design goal is to provide a convenient
framework for incorporating other protocols.
The SDSI specification also says, "We envision that a separate SDSI transport
protocol can be designed on top of TCP/IP. Ultimately, this would be the preferred




( N: #B8D1C7A2EB ... )
( E: #11 ) ) )
( Server-At: 18.52.0.220 pine.lcs.mit.edu:8002 spruce.lcs.mit.edu:sdsi ) )
Figure 2-5: A Principal: with three servers.
but also of the fact that other application-level "media", like email, can be used to
execute protocols.
Altogether, then, a SDSI implementation's set of protocol primitives is very im-
portant - it should be a group of functions that are convenient and abstract, to
encourage protocol development and allow for the use of different transport media for
communication. This SDSI implementation includes suitable primitives that address
these two concerns.
2.5.1 Transport mechanism
First and foremost, this SDSI library's natural transport mechanism is TCP. This
choice immediately points out an underspecified feature of SDSI Principal :s - it is
unclear exactly what the members of their Server-At: and Principal-At: fields
can be.
Introducing a bit of terminology, the library refers to these members as endpoints,
because they are meant identify one end of a communications channel to which pro-
tocol messages can be addressed. The specification says only that an endpoint is
included "typically as a partial URL", and gives several URL examples.
While endpoints could one day be partial URLs, this library assumes now that
all endpoints do nothing more than designate an Internet machine and a TCP port
number that protocol connections can be made to. These endpoints take the form of
an Internet hostname or IP address, followed by an optional port name or number.
For example, a Principal: with three SDSI servers is shown in Figure 2-5. The
three Server-At: members illustrate some of the possibilities for endpoint names.
The port name or number is always separated from the machine name or number by
a colon, and if it isn't present, : sdsi is assumed. Port names and machine names are
resolved according to normal Unix conventions3 , to yield a complete Internet address
that a TCP connection can be opened to.
Once a connection has been opened, SDSI S-expression objects that are the mes-
sages of the ensuing protocol are exchanged over it, by sending and receiving those
objects' canonical representations.
2.5.2 Protocol state
In this library, the central feature of the suite of protocol functions is the protocol state
object that they all use. This is a data structure that holds information describing
a protocol in progress, and it is used largely to shield the users of these primitives
from the specific details of the message exchange. The protocol state carries values
describing:
* The current input and output streams associated with the protocol connection.
Normally, callers never provide these; however, they can be specified if a protocol
is being driven over byte streams not associated with a TCP network connection
made by the library.
* The endpoints of the protocol connection. One is the local endpoint name,
describing the local end of connection, and two are used to describe the remote
end. If this protocol state is for the client side of a connection, the remote
endpoint name holds the originally specified endpoint name of the server, and
the canonical remote endpoint name is the endpoint name that the connection
was actually made to. (There can be a difference when there is DNS indirection
at work.) These two remote endpoint names are identical when the protocol
state is for the server end of a connection.
3 1.e., gethostbyname(3) and getservbyname(3) are used to resolve host and service names into
IP addresses and TCP port numbers. If the service name sdsi cannot be resolved, 2500 is assumed
by the library.
* Timeout values, specifying how long a server should wait for an incoming con-
nection, and how long the next message from the remote endpoint should be
waited for.
* Flag values, controlling how the local and remote ends are running the con-
nection. These flags specify how the two ends are to sign and/or encrypt the
messages they send, and their last-message-hash discipline.
* A list of the principals and corresponding signatures that signed the last message
received. This list defines the set of remote speakers, or participants, in this
protocol.
* Last-message-hash information for the next messages to be sent and received,
and optional values that override the keys used for local or remote message
encryption, or the key and lifetime information used in local signing.
2.5.3 The protocol functions
All of the SDSI library's protocol functions take a protocol state as an argument.
There are functions that:
* Listen for client connections to a particular local endpoint name. This function
is used by servers to wait for client requests.
* Establish a new connection to the server listening at the remote endpoint spec-
ified in the protocol state.
* Explicitly close an open connection.
* Manage the sending and receiving of messages. Once a connection has been
made and accepted, two functions handle all of the messages that travel over
the connection. These functions take care of encrypting, decrypting, signing,
and verifying all messages as necessary.
* Construct and send an error message to the remote end of a connection.
* Establish a new connection to the next server of a particular remote Principal:.
This function works like an iterator: aside from the protocol state, it maintains
another piece of private state, so when called in a loop, it will move its caller's
connection successively through the list of a remote principal's servers.
* Iterate a query-response session with the servers of a particular remote
Principal:. This builds on top of the previous function, by sending a given
query message once the next connection has been opened, receiving a response,
closing the connection, and returning the response. This kind of behavior is
useful for simple protocols like Get, which form a single query for all servers,
and address it to each one in turn, stopping when one of them returns an "ac-
ceptable" response (where "acceptable" depends on the particular protocol).
This function is called in a loop until a satisfactory response is returned, or
until there are no more servers to query.
One last, curious function is one that is used to discover a server's Principal:
definition. When a query addressed to a particular principal needs to be sent to one
of his servers, and needs to be encrypted, it needs to be encrypted such that the
receiving server, and not the addressed principal, can decrypt it.
This final function, given a message type, a client principal, and the endpoint of
one of that principal's servers, queries all Delegation. Cert :s that the client principal
has issued, that allow others to sign objects of the given message type. This list is
then searched for a certificate that names a principal whose Principal-At: member
matches the desired server's endpoint. This is the actual Principal: that is the
server, and it is to this principal the original query needs to be encrypted.
2.6 Cryptography functions
SDSI's use of cryptography is the basis of what inspires trust in it, making the cryp-
tography routines yet another important component of any implementation. However,
in a certain sense, this component also stands to be the most fragile.
Today, with the increased visibility of cryptography, more and more attention
is being focused on breaking hash functions and cryptosystems. This is why all
of SDSI's cryptographic S-expression objects are so flexible - they always explicitly
specify which hash function or cryptosystem is tied to their use. As cryptosystems
and hashes fall to attacks, new ones can be brought into service in SDSI without any
change to the general object syntax in use.
This does mean, though, that implementations have to be ready to accept and
provide new cryptosystems as easily as possible. An ideal implementation supports
all of the suitable and "unshaken" hashes, and public- and secret-key cryptosystems
that are currently available.
The vision of such a "cryptographically ideal" SDSI implementation drove the
design of this library's cryptographic routines. Accordingly, there is a clean split be-
tween library functions that consider general cryptographic operations and those that
take real cryptographic actions. For example, the function that takes a key and plain-
text, prepares for an encryption and assembles the resulting final SDSI Encrypted:
object, is separate from the function that actually generates ciphertexts from plain-
texts. The former deals with keys, plaintexts, and ciphertexts in a very general way,
while only the latter treats them as participants in a specific cryptosystem.
2.6.1 Key profiles
To allow for this break between general and specific cryptographic functions, and to
easily support a large number of cryptosystems, the idea of a key profile was created.
A key profile is a data structure that contains all of the pertinent information of a
key, extracted into a generic, easy-to-use object.
Every key has properties that exist somewhat independently of the bit-by-bit
details of how it is actually used within its cryptosystem. Whether a key is a public,
private, or shared-secret key, whether it can only be used with signatures, how many
bits of data it can operate on, and whether or not it can operate on more through
chaining, are all examples of attributes that more general cryptographic routines want
to know when they are dealing with keys.
Key profiles are used inside the library to carry this information alongside a copy
of the key's core and complete break down of the key's type name. For example, the
public key:
( Public-Key: ( RSA-with-SHA1:
( N: #B8DIC7A2EB ... )
( E: #11 ) ) )
would be manipulated as a profile of a public key that can encrypt and verify signa-
tures, and that can encrypt up to 512 bits (assume #B8D1C7A2EB ... is 512 bits long)
but cannot do any chaining. Also stored in the key profile would be key's type (RSA),
associated signing hash function (SHA1) and the key core:
( RSA-with-SHAi:
( N: #B8D1C7A2EB ... )
( E: #11 ) )
For manipulating key cores themselves, functions are available that:
* Turn a complete SDSI -Key: object into a completed key profile.
* Use a passphrase to complete the key core of an unfinished profile. This is used
when a shared-secret-key's secret data is provided as a passphrase by a human
user, and it needs to be turned into a useful key.
* Complete the key core of an unfinished profile with random key data. This is
used for generating random session keys.
These key profiles are always passed from the general to the specific cryptographic
functions (also called the cryptographic primitives), and they direct the latter to a
particular cryptosystem.
2.6.2 Cryptographic primitives
The cryptographic primitives are the functions of the SDSI library that are actually
aware of the different hash functions and cryptosystems available to the library. It
is in these functions that the "rubber meets the road"4 and calls to the third-party
cryptography modules are made. Aside from the primitives used for turning -Key:
objects, passphrases, and random sources properly into key profiles, there are very
few of them.
There are only two primitive hash functions: one that takes a hash function name
and indicates whether or not it is supported, and another that takes a hash function
name and an octet-string, and returns its raw hash under that function as another
octet-string. Several more general and complex SDSI library hash functions, ignorant
of the actual supported hashes, are build on top of these primitives.
The remaining four cryptographic primitives all involve running real cryptosys-
tems. Most of these functions' bodies consist of C switch statements, with one case
arm for each supported cryptosystem. The specific type contained in the key profile
they all take as an argument chooses which arm will run. Adding more cryptosystems,
then, means only adding more arms to these existing pairs of functions:
* One function encrypts a plaintext octet-string into a SDSI object containing
the ciphertext in the format most suitable for the specified cryptosystem.
* Another function takes those cipher objects and recovers their plaintext.
* One function signs a plaintext octet-string and returns a SDSI object containing
the signature in the format most suitable for the specified signature system.
* Another function takes those signature objects and verifies their contents.
On top of these primitives are built the top-level SDSI library cipher and signature
functions.
2.7 Performance notes
This SDSI library is a concrete, working implementation that has seen some tinkering
use by its developer, and some more involved use by the developer of the SDSI user
4 Professor David Gifford introduced me to this great term.
interface[l]. As such, there are some performance notes to relate, as well as some
retrospection about the how the library was written.
Concern for the library's speed came from the sluggish response times seen from
the SDSI servers brought up during the user interface development. A server's speed
is a function of two things:
1. The size of the object cache it must manipulate. This is the sum total of the
objects it is distributing on behalf of its clients, plus all of the other credentials
it has cached from previous "network encounters". The number of objects in
this cache affects a query's service time.
2. The speed of important library functions. The remainder of a query's service
time, once the cache size factor has been removed, lies in those functions needed
to prepare the response.
An analysis of the first effect is in Section 3.3. To give some insight into the
library's role in server performance, a crude program was written to test three library
functions important to servers: hashing, creating signatures, and verifying signatures.
This program was run on an unloaded Sun SPARCstation 5 with 28MB of memory
to gauge how the library performs.
The results were less than exciting. Performing 10,000 SHA1 hashes of the sim-
ple, unsigned Cert: in Figure 2-6 took 14.78 seconds, showing that the library can
generate around 680 hashes per second.
Signing with RSA was the slowest of the three operations. To sign the same Cert:
100 times with a 512-bit key took 50 seconds, meaning 2 signatures were generated
per second. Signature verification was much faster - the library can verify around
30 signatures per second, verifying 100 times a signature made on the test Cert: in
only 3.03 seconds. The sluggish signing time, thankfully, is at least one-third due
to the actual RSA modular exponentiation. (Even though verification is the same
operation, it ends up being much faster because the public exponent is usually very
small compared to its private counterpart.)
( Cert:









( E: #11 ) ) )
( Server-At: spruce.lcs.mit.edu oak.lcs.mit.edu ) ) ) )
Figure 2-6: The Cert: used to performance-test the library.
Forgetting the real cryptography overhead, these slow times can be blamed on the
lack of optimization in the library's design. A very fast design was not developed for
two reasons: first and foremost, a heavily optimized library would be very difficult
to understand, and, in any case, time constraints prevented any thoughts of fancy,
fast code. Something that was easy to understand and debug, and would be finished
soon, was the goal throughout library development.
2.7.1 Retrospection
As the performance problems and, to a certain extent, the form of the code itself
show, this library was not written exactly as I would write it now. I had some very
specific wishes for this implementation that crept up over the months it took to write
it, that I couldn't follow. Given more time, I would have liked to add the following:
1. Group membership hints. This is the only significant part of the SDSI specifica-
tion missing from this library (another part being the RFC822 address-to-ref :
translation). The group membership check function only returns true, false, or
fail, with no credentials hint accompanying the latter two indications. A truly
complete library would include code to both assemble these hints, and to use
them in preparing followup queries.
2. More intelligent object scanning. There are some bugs in the way the library
currently scans objects from character streams, especially when it comes to
strings, and fragments of strings. The scanning routines also read a character-
at-a-time out of an input stream, which isn't efficient at all (especially when
the input stream is really a network socket).
3. Faster object printing. Like scanning, the library isn't very quick about dis-
playing objects. On the surface, this doesn't appear to be that important, but
since printing objects happens quite a bit "under the hood" of the library, this
does contribute to speed problems.
4. Better file format used in the cache and localities. The cache objects and
the locality files are not stored in a particularly efficient manner - objects are
"printed" to disk files in their SDSI canonical form. It takes quite a while to
scan in elements of the cache and localities.
5. More memoization in the cache manager. Besides caching locality contents, it
might be a win for the cache manager to remember even more specific sets of
objects - those sets that satisfy certain queries.
6. Faster template matching. Perhaps a loss of generality in exchange for more
speed would be a good idea. This could be achieved immediately by writing a
better sds if ind attribut e_value.
7. Smarter setting of current principal throughout an object. Currently, this is
done every time an element is added to an object being built by the sdsi_add_
functions. This doesn't need to be done for every element added, really - just
after the last one, and the actual act of setting could probably be made faster.
8. Better error reporting. Currently, error messages are short, and while they do
give a message describing a problem that caused the error, there is no larger
context given to appreciate the message in. For example, if deep in some op-
eration riddled with ref: evaluations, one of the evaluations fails, it would be
nice if the library included the offending ref: in an error message. Something
like an error context structure in the library, where library functions put objects
involved in errors, would be a good thing.
9. Faster error-handling primitives. By the primitives, I mean the SETJMP and
LONGJMP macros used by the library's prologue and error macros. Currently,
the library uses the system's standard setjmp and longjmp functions. A much
faster library would feature specialized assembly-language functions for this
task5 .
10. A consistent function naming scheme. About halfway through, I changed from
a sdsi-verb_action form to a sdsi module-verb_action form. It's not a big deal,
but I think the latter style would be better for this library.




The SDSI object server, (also called the SDSI server, or just the server) is a program
that answers SDSI network queries. This program turns a workstation into an exam-
ple of the most tangible and essential elements of the SDSI infrastructure. Principals
rely on the servers they are registered with to provide their SDSI presence; they are
listed in a Principal:'s Server-At: field, and
... distribute certificates and other signed statements on behalf of the
principal. If more than one server is specified, it is understood that the
servers are equivalent, and that a query could be addressed to any one of
them. The servers should have high reliability and high on-line availability,
whereas the principal may be frequently or even permanently off-line.
The server is a short program, at just over two hundred and fifty lines. It is based
on the library, and is a good example of a library client. Because it is so short and
does so little outside of making library calls, it is extremely bound to this library's
particular implementation. The library does so much of the work of actually being a
server, that few design choices needed to be made for the server program, and those
that were left were tied directly to the features and general disposition of the library.
As a result, much of this chapter is not of real interest except to those making use of
this particular implementation.
This server serves the three standard protocols from the SDSI specification: the
Get, Reconfirm, and Membership protocols. These three protocols make basic certifi-
cate and membership information distribution possible. A fourth protocol, not in the
original specification, was designed and added to fill an important void - the Update
protocol exists for principals registered with a server to update their databases on
that server. This protocol is described in Section 3.1.
Several notes on the actual operation of a SDSI server running this program are
offered in Section 3.2. Many of them, like those that concern cache localities, are
specific to the design choices made in the library. A small handful are generic, and
mostly have to do with principal registration on servers.
3.1 The Update protocol
The SDSI specification says that "a server for a principal can be viewed primarily as
an agent with a database of statements signed by that principal," but it fails to say
how that database is managed by the principal. No protocol or procedures are given
for a principal to use to add or remove certificates from that database. The Update
protocol provides this functionality.
The Update protocol is completely implemented in the library, as are Get and the
other SDSI protocols. It is not discussed in Chapter 2 with the rest of the library,
because it seemed more fitting to discuss a protocol so specific to a server's operation
in the chapter about the server.
The Update protocol exists to allow a user registered with a server to do two
things:
* Add new certificates to his database on that server. This strictly augments
that database - the protocol and the server make no attempt to remove or
demote older certificates that are superseded in any sense whatsoever by new
certificates.
* Remove certificates from the database on that server. This can only be used to
remove specific certificates previously issued by the principal.
Of those two, removing certificates is the more interesting operation. To be spe-
cific, when a principal removes certificates from a server, they are not so much re-
moved, as are their signatures revoked.
This seems rather contradictory to SDSI, since its online signature reconfirmations
are supposed to eliminate the need for signature revocation lists. This is true at large,
within the infrastructure, but an individual principal's servers, since they are that
principal's proxy in the infrastructure, do need to have a list of signatures that have
been revoked by the principal.
Without these local signature revocation lists, if a server merely "forgot about"
and deleted revoked certificates from its cache to express their revocation, problems
could happen. One example of such a problem is what would happen when one of
a principal's revoked certificates came back to the server in some client's request, as
credentials for that client. Assuming the signature (aside from really having been
revoked) was still valid, the server would have nothing to "remind" it that it has been
revoked - it could just be a certificate that its client issued that it has never seen
before1, or it could be a revoked certificate. Signature revocation lists are necessary
on the server as state, to prevent clients' revoked certificates from being wrongly
accepted.
The Update protocol is a simple two message command-response protocol. The
command message is called an Update. Order, and it is a signed request that contains
an Update section, a Revoked: section, or both. The Update section contains any new
certificates that should be added to a user's database. Any Revoked: section contains
the previously issued Signed: objects that should now be considered revoked.
Figures 3-1 and 3-2 contain two example Update. Orders. While any inner Cert:
and Signed: objects within the orders represent valid signatures, these entire protocol
messages will still be signed, for integrity, by the library when they are actually
submitted to servers - and they will be signed with very short lifetimes, to prevent
against replay attacks.
1This can especially happen when the certificate is a Membership. Cert: that the client principal




( ACL: ( read: ALL! ) )
( Local-Name: enemy )
( Value: ( Principal: ( Public-Key:
( RSA-with-MD5:
( N: #D2AA328CB2BFO2 ... )
(E: #11 ) ) ) ) )
( Signed:
( Date: 1997-03-18T15:09:37.625-0500 )
( Re-confirm: ( Period: PT5M ) )
( Signer: ( Principal: ( Public-Key:
( RSA-with-SHA1:
( N: #B8D1C7A2EBCE4EDDD3 ... )
( E: #11 ) ) )
( Server-At: oak.lcs.mit.edu spruce.lcs.mit.edu ) ) )
( Object-Hash: ( SHAl #2F623FEE40 ... ) )
( Signature: #B059111A80A5ACE5C35B ... ) ) ) ) )





( Date: 1997-03-18T14:55:54.734-0500 )
( Re-confirm: ( Period: PT5M ) )
( Signer: ( Principal: ( Public-Key:
( RSA-with-SHA1:
( N: #B8D1C7A ... )
( E: #11 ) ) )
( Server-At: oak.lcs.mit.edu spruce.lcs.mit.edu ) ) )
( Object-Hash: ( SHA1 #95E76B ... ) )
( Signature: #9B9F783739DF7A37 ... ) ) ) ) )
Figure 3-2: An Update. Order that revokes a signature.
The order in Figure 3-1 submits a new, signed, name-binding Cert: to the server.
Figure 3-2 is an Update.0rder that revokes a previously-issued Signed: object from
the server, which will effectively remove the object it signed - usually some kind of
certificate - from the client's database on the server.
The Update.Reply message is extremely uninteresting. It is nothing more than
a list message with the word Update.Reply signed by the server that received the
order.
The code that runs on servers that handles Update. Orders takes care to only
service orders from principals that are registered with the server. How principals
become registered with servers is discussed in the next section.
3.2 Operation notes
There are not too many details surrounding running a SDSI server based on this
implementation. Three things concern an operator of one of these servers: the creation
of the server, the registration of new users on it, and regular maintenance of its object
cache. Most of these operation notes are specific to this implementation.
To create a new server, first a principal for the server must be generated. This is
done using the pgp-to-sdsi tool discussed in Chapter 4 to convert a PGP private
keyring created just for the new server into a SDSI principal definition. This principal
definition should then be placed in a new directory, created to contain it and the
directories for the server's object cache and localities.
Registering new principals as clients of the server involves using the SDSI shell
or its user interface [1], to sign and cache new membership certificates as the server
principal. Each new Membership.Cert: will assert that one new client principal is a
member of a special group belonging to the server2 . This special group exists so the
library has a way of knowing the set of principals allowed to submit Update. Orders
to the server, and hence knows who is a proper registered client of the server.
2The actual group name is sdsi-server-clients. For the curious, this is maintained as a
preprocessor symbol in the file sdsi.h of this implementation.
Once a server's principal has been created and some clients registered, the server
can be brought up on the Internet. The server program, called sdsid, is a single,
standalone binary (see Section 3.3 for more information on why) that is launched at
the command line. It listens for Get, Reconfirm, Membership, and Update queries
on TCP port 2500 on all network interfaces.
The only remaining operational decision is: how often should the server's localities
be rebuilt? For good performance, the SDSI library makes use of the externally-built
cache associations called localities, introduced in Section 2.3.1. This particular server
uses the coarse cache searching behavior defined in that section, meaning that to
satisfy queries, it searches localities exclusively, and ignores actual cache contents.
So, as new objects are added to the server's cache through the Update protocol,
they will not be reflected in responses from the server until the localities are next
rebuilt. Localities are rebuilt using the sdsi-cleanup-rebuild program, discussed
in Chapter 4, but as the rebuilding process is disk- and CPU-expensive, the frequency
of the rebuilds has to reflect a balance between this fact and the desire for a server
that is appropriately up-to-date.
No suggestions are available to help decide how often cache localities should be re-
built. The decision depends on the combination of a server's cache size, CPU power3,
and desired "reflection time" for new submitted certificates. These are all factors that
depend on situation, and no trials were run for any significant combinations to offer
any hints here.
Once a suitable locality-rebuilding frequency has been chosen, all that has to be
done is invoke sdsi-cleanup-rebuild at the appropriate times.
3.3 Performance notes
This SDSI server, sdsid, is designed to run monolithically on a workstation, meaning
that it is always running, as one single-threaded process that never forks, answering
3 Although it is interesting to note that if a SDSI server's localities are stored in a network
filesystem, they can be rebuilt by a machine other than the server itself.
all queries addressed to the server. The monolithic decision was made for two reasons:
1. While the localities, even when on disk, make for faster cache searches, for max-
imum performance they are kept in memory whenever possible, since scanning
them in from disk incurs some cost (Section 2.3.1). One long-lived server pro-
cess only has to scan a locality in when it is first needed, or when it changes
on disk; if a new server process were started to answer each individual query,
relevant localities would have to be scanned in, guaranteed, for every query.
2. The image of the server process in memory is typically large, and contains
sensitive information, like the server's private key. The former is true because
it does store localities in memory, as mentioned above, for performance. Forking
a process of this size may incur a significant penalty on some systems, and at
least always increases the amount of virtual memory that addresses sensitive
data. Not forking prevents any such penalty, and also keeps the number of
processes that carry sensitive information to the absolute minimum.
Query service time on a SDSI server with full locality support, then, is not a
function of the number of principals the server serves for. Rather, a query's service
time is related to the sizes of the localities associated with the principals on the server
that are involved, directly or indirectly, in the query.
For example, a simple query addressed to a client of a server, that involves no
credentials from other clients of the same server, will only involve the speaker locality
associated with the client.
If the query relies on credentials from another client on the same server, however,
the speaker locality of that client is also involved in answering the query (even if
sufficient credentials were included directly in the query). This last fact is a result of
the way that cache searches are run by the library - the credentials in the query will
be found first, but if the library has another place it can look in for more, possibly
relevant signed statements from the same individual, (in this case, an available speaker
locality, since the credentials came from a local client) it will look there.
( Cert:
( ACL: ( read: ALL! ) )
( Local-Name: dude39 )
( Value: buddy39 ) )
Figure 3-3: The thirty-ninth certificate of a principal with 100.
It is really quite hard to give real numbers about query service times, since those
times do depend so heavily on the size and number of certificates issued by the
principal being queried. The only numbers available from testing involve querying
a principal with 100 certificates, all similar to the thirty-ninth such certificate in
Figure 3-3.
Two tests were run, both making a query for this certificate. One test made the
query to a server that had just been started, and so had no localities loaded into
memory, and the second made the query to a server that was known to have the
queried principal's locality in memory - merely the same server that had just passed
the first test. The server in question was an unloaded Sun SPARCstation 5 with
28MB of memory.
The performance numbers for the server were, like the performance numbers for
the library (Section 2.7), uninspiring. The first query took almost 75 seconds, and
the second query took 34 seconds. These times include everything the server did
to service the query, from verifying the signature on the request, to performing the
certificate search, to signing and returning the result.
The difference of forty seconds can be completely attributed to the amount of
time the server, during the first test, took to read the queried principal's locality into
memory. The size of this locality was 70K on disk. The "real" time of 34 seconds
includes searching through the loaded locality with the template, searching through it
again to pick up the Delegation-Cert: needed to sign the reply, and finally signing
and returning the reply.
Not much more can be said about the server's poor performance, except that many
approaches taken in designing the library were less than optimal, from a speed per-
spective. Section 2.7.1 discusses them. If the library were appropriately redesigned,
the server's performance could be much better.
Chapter 4
Supporting tools
The SDSI library and server from this implementation do not make a complete and
usable SDSI package. Many necessary support functions, some implied by features
present and missing from the library, are still needed. These include:
* Key generation. A SDSI server or user has to create a principal (i.e., a pub-
lic/private key pair) in order to do anything. The library and server provide no
key generation routines.
* Cache and locality maintenance. The SDSI library only knows how to grow its
object cache, not shrink it, and how to use localities, not make them. Left to
its own devices, the library will grow its object cache forever and never update
the associated localities.
* A real user interface. With servers running, but nothing in the hands of the
users except the library, SDSI would not be usable. Individual library programs
would have to be written and compiled for every task.
These missing items are provided as additional support programs, all based on
the library. For key generation, one tool leverages off of PGP's key generation abil-
ity, and merely converts PGP key rings into certificates and principal definitions.
pgp-to-sdsi is discussed in Section 4.1.
sdsi-rebuild-cleanup, covered in Section 4.2, is a program that cleans "dead"
objects out of the cache, and rebuilds the cache localities.
Most important of all, a program that is the foundation for a user interface,
sdsish, is introduced in Section 4.3. This "SDSI shell" is a command-line interface
to the SDSI library, and allows the user to type commands to manipulate, sign,
and encrypt SDSI objects and execute queries. It also has hooks in it to enable a
larger, more user-friendly World Wide Web interface[1] to execute its shell commands
automatically.
4.1 The PGP-to-SDSI converter
The PGP-to-SDSI converter is quite possibly the most significant of the tools, because,
as its name implies, it forges a link from PGP [2] to SDSI. It can do two things: given
a PGP private key ring, it will make a SDSI principal definition (Section 2.1.6), and
given a PGP public key ring, it will make crude SDSI name-binding certificates, that
the user can finish and sign at his convenience.
The former ability eliminates the need for the library to have its own public/private
keypair generator, since it effectively uses the well-written one already included in the
PGP distribution. Plus, if someone is already using PGP, they can continue to use
the same public key in SDSI.
The latter ability, to convert a PGP public key ring into preliminary name-binding
certificates, is even more important. This allows a user to automatically convert the
entries of people he already knows closely in his PGP "web of trust" into entries in
his initial SDSI local namespace. When those other PGP-savvy friends, relatives,
and colleagues do the same, immediately a sizeable number of SDSI linked local
namespaces will exist.
Virtually no choices were involved in the design of this converter; once the PGP
keyring format[3] was found, writing the converter was more of an exercise in using
and an opportunity to test the cryptographic routines in the SDSI library. When
converting members of a public key ring, nothing is actually encrypted - the elements
of each member (the username, and RSA modulus and public exponent) are merely
turned into octet-strings, and used to build up a Cert: that binds the username to
% pgp-to-sdsi ~/.pgp/pubring.pgp
PGP version number in key certificate is 3.
crude unsigned certificate for "alyssa.p.hacker":
( Cert:




( N: #CDF44F325A9DF4 ... )
(E: #11 ) ) ) ) )
done.
Figure 4-1: An example of pgp-to-sdsi converting a PGP public key ring.
a principal based on that public key.
For example, Figure 4-1 shows pgp-to-sdsi converting a public keyring with one
element. It yields a name-binding certificate that the user can finish (by replacing
the ??? with the name of the signing hash that the principal actually uses), and then
sign and distribute to his servers.
When converting a user's private keyring, a sealed private RSA exponent is found
alongside the user's public RSA modulus in the ring. The exponent is sealed in an
IDEA key derived from the user's passphrase. After the user provides the passphrase,
this exponent is unsealed and a SDSI Private-Key: object is built around it. The
Private-Key: is then resealed in the original IDEA key and added to the user's new
principal definition, which also holds a Principal: constructed from his public key.
Once generated through this process, a user's principal definition can be stored in
a file and be used in interactions with the SDSI shell or user interface [1]. Normally,
this is the case, and the user will proceed immediately to use the shell or user interface
to sign and issue the selected certificates formed from his PGP public keyring.
Or, if the principal definition was newly created just for use as the principal that
will "be" a SDSI server, the new server can now be brought up, and configured. More
about operating SDSI servers is found in Chapter 3.
4.2 The cache cleaner and locality rebuilder
The tool that cleans SDSI object caches, and rebuilds localities in the process, is called
sdsi-rebuild-cleanup. As its name and the previous sentence hint, this program
does two things:
1. It removes elements from the permanent cache that are found to be "dead".
A cache element, strictly speaking, is a top-level protocol message that was
received, or a locally-generated certificate, that was written into its own file into
the cache. A cache element is dead when it contains no unexpired signatures
and none of its object or subobjects are signed by an unexpired signature.
2. It rebuilds the cache localities. Localities, discussed in Section 2.3.1, are special-
ized subsets of the objects in the cache, used to speed cache searches. When the
cache grows with new objects, the library does not update any of the localities
- for the new cache objects to be reflected in the localities, the latter have to be
rebuilt.
This is by no means a glamorous tool; it's a C program based on the library that
is not pretty to look at, and it has some shortcomings. It works by first finding the
cache and localities directories that the library uses through environment variables
(see Section 2.1.7 for a discussion of how common filesystem elements are specified to
the library), and walks the elements in the cache, building a new localities directory
near the old one.
The cache is walked in two passes. Pass one finds all Signed: objects anywhere
in the cache that have not expired. Pass two loops over all element objects and
subobjects, building the speaker, object, key, and Signed: localities it finds along the
way, in this manner:
* A subobject gets added to the speaker locality associated with each principal
who has signed it. A speaker's speaker locality filename is based on the MD5
hash of the speaking Principal:, and this file ends up containing every object
in the cache that the principal has signed.
* If a subobject is a Signed:, it gets added to an object locality associated with
the object it signs. The filenames of an object's object locality files (there
can be several of them) are based directly on the Object-Hash:s included in
the Signed:s that sign them. This means that an object's object locality is a
collection of files by hash function, with each file containing all signatures on
the object that used that hash function.
* If a subobject is some kind of -Key:, it gets added to the corresponding key
locality, depending on whether it is a public, private, or shared-secret key.
* Signed: localities are not actually separate localities - they are more concep-
tual. As described in Section 2.3.1, a Signed:'s locality is a combination of the
part of the object locality its Object-Hash: makes it a member of, plus the
object locality that is associated with it. (The two are different - the latter is a
locality that includes all of the Signed:s that sign the original Signed:).
While pass two walks the cache, building these localities, any cache elements that
are not found to contain live signed data, are removed. When sdsi-rebuild-cleanup
is done, it removes the old localities directory and replaces it with the new one it just
finished.
4.2.1 Known bugs
There are some known bugs in sdsi-rebuild-cleanup.
1. It assumes that the user is using localities. Currently, it can't be used to merely
clean the cache of a user that doesn't use localities. If a localities directory
can't be found, it will dump core; the temporary solution is to create a locali-
ties directory, run sdsi-rebuild-cleanup, and then remove the resulting new
localities directory.
2. When sdsi-rebuild-cleanup is finished rebuilding the new localities in its
temporary directory, it swaps out the old localities directory and swaps in the
temporary one under the correct name. To prevent insanity for the duration of
the two system calls necessary to do this, it is supposed to send a SIGHUP to a
running sdsid (the SDSI object server), to make it pause for 4 seconds while
the swap happens. sdsid writes its process ID to a file in /tmp for this purpose,
but sdsi-rebuild-cleanup never checks for it, reads it, and sends the signal.
3. Pass one just looks for signatures that indicate that they haven't expired yet; it
doesn't actually check to see that signatures are cryptographically valid - i.e.,
sdsi-rebuild-cleanup never confirms the contents of Signed:s' Signature:
fields.
4.3 The SDSI shell
The SDSI shell, sdsish, is absolutely the most useful SDSI tool. pgp-to-sdsi is
important; this shell is useful. It is a basically nothing except a command line interface
to SDSI library functions, but the fact that such an interface exists means that people
can use SDSI.
The shell allows a human user to create and manipulate objects, manage his
object cache and server databases, and perform all sorts of queries. The command
environment is rather flexible: named variables are used with all commands, and
command results are returned in new named variables.
sdsish also serves to support the SDSI Web-based graphical user interface[l].
It does this by running as a network daemon, allowing certain locally-running Perl
scripts to connect to it and issue shell commands. It also runs the Web server and
Web browser that, with those scripts, complete the GUI architecture.
4.3.1 Command line mode
The command line mode is started by invoking the shell as sdsish. Using the princi-
pal definition file as found by the library (see Section 2.1.7 for a discussion of how the
library finds common filesystem elements), it asks the user for the passphrase that
unseals the definition's private key, then presents a simple prompt:
sdsish>
From this prompt, many different SDSI operations are possible. There are several
commands currently available; Figure 4-2 shows the output of the help command
listing them.
All commands take their arguments, with the exception of their integer arguments,
through named variables - SDSI objects are never given literally on the command
line. Variables are introduced with the define command, and can be displayed with
the print command. Examples of how variables are created and displayed are in
Figure 4-3.
Once variables have been defined, commands are given to work on them. There
are enough commands to prevent discussion of each one here, but a help facility has
been built into the shell: help command-name will bring up a few sentences on how
to use the named command.
One example of issuing a command is given in Figure 4-4. It shows a variable
being defined to hold a Cert: object, and the sign command being used to sign
it'. Note how the result of the sign is both displayed and assigned to a new named
variable, $0. A new "dollar temporary" is defined to hold the result of any command
that returns some value, to allow the use of that value in subsequent commands.
4.3.2 Graphical user interface mode
The previous section describes the command line mode of sdsish. The shell also
has a graphical user interface (GUI) mode, which exists to support Gillian Elcock's
Web-based user interface[1], by providing its command set to Perl scripts triggered
by a user's interactions with a Web browser.
The GUI mode is started by invoking the shell as sdsiui. When run under this
name, the shell never puts up a command line for the user, but instead bootstraps the
1The 2 argument to sign asks for an appendix mode signature on the object being signed. This
value corresponds directly to the flags value passed in to the sdsi.sign.object library function;






























- defines a new variable
- prints a variable
- executes a Get query
- performs a namespace lookup
- hashes an object
- evaluates an object
- almost-evaluates an object
- sets an object's current principal
- forces an object's current principal
- signs an object
- confirms an object's signers
- verifies a Signed: object
- encrypts an object
- decrypts an object
- adds an object to the cache
- deletes a cache subset
- returns the car of a list object
- returns the cdr of a list object
- returns the cons of two objects
- updates your servers
- sets the display width
- sets the next $ temporary number
- executes a Membership query
- compares two objects
sdsish>
Figure 4-2: The list of sdsish commands.
sdsish> define my-cert
remember a lone string definition must end with a dot on a line by itself.
( Cert: ( Local-Name: favorite-color ) ( Value: blue ) )
sdsish> print cert
( Cert: ( Local-Name: favorite-color ) ( Value: blue ) )
sdsish> define car-make





remember a lone string definition must end with a dot on a line by itself.
( Cert: ( Local-Name: car-make ) ( Value: Volkswagen ) )
sdsish> print my-cert
( Cert: ( Local-Name: car-make ) ( Value: Volkswagen ) )
sdsish>
Figure 4-3: Examples of creating and displaying variables in sdsish.
GUI and makes that command line available to the GUI's Perl scripts. This involves
the following:
1. A child process is started that will listen for HTTP connections from a Web
browser. The TCP port it listens on is assigned at random by the operating
system, out of the set of available ports. Each incoming connection is passed
to a freshly-invoked HTTP server.
Currently, the only supported HTTP server is NCSA's httpd. The specific
one to use is found in the gui directory of the user's SDSI directory (see Sec-
tion 2.1.7 for a discussion of how the library finds common filesystem elements)
or indicated explicitly by the environment variable SDSIGUIJTTPD. The con-
figuration file for httpd, httpd. conf, is found alongside it, or is indicated by
the environment variable SDSIGUIHTTPDCONF.
2. A cryptographic nonce, called a cookie, is generated. This nonce will be used by
the GUI Perl scripts to authenticate themselves to the shell when they connect
to it, so that they can issue shell commands to sign certificates, etc., as the
sdsish> define cert
remember a lone string definition must end with a dot on a line by itself.
( Cert: ( Local-Name: favorite-color ) ( Value: blue ) )
sdsish> sign cert 2
( Cert:
( Local-Name: favorite-color )
( Value: blue )
( Signed:





( N: #CDF44F325A9DF471 ... )
( E: #11 ) ) )
( Server-At: spruce.lcs.mit.edu ) ) )
( Object-Hash: ( SHA1 #E7AB87437B ... ) )
( Signature: #844BCF484339DFD9 ... ) ) )
that returned value has been named $0.
sdsish>
Figure 4-4: An example of using the sign command in sdsish.
current user. Two parts of this cookie are actually the TCP port on which the
shell will be listening for connections from the Perl scripts, and the TCP port
that the HTTP server child is listening on.
3. A Web browser is started to display the GUI's home page, or a currently running
browser is signaled to load it in. Like the HTTP server support, only one Web
browser, Netscape, is currently recognized by the shell.
The page that the new or existing Netscape is pointed to is actually a small
HTML "cookie" page. Stored in /tmp, and readable only by the current user,
this page instructs the browser to load the real GUI home page through an
initial CGI script, passing it the cookie. Only scripts invoked from pages tracing
their "heritage" back to this original CGI script invocation will have the cookie
necessary to connect to the shell, authenticate to it and issue commands.
4. The shell then waits for connections from the GUI Perl scripts. A connection
is closed immediately unless the remote peer is on the local machine and can
present the correct cookie. This prevents connections from other parties from
being able to present commands to the shell and have them executed as the
current user.
Once a connection from a GUI Perl script is successfully established, the shell
executes the commands presented to it, and returns their results. More detail about
the GUI, its architecture, and the authentication mechanism described loosely above,
can be found in [1].
4.3.3 The code, adding new commands
The code that makes up sdsish, like that for sdsi-rebuild-cleanup, isn't the
prettiest. This is because sdsish was originally conceived more as a tool for testing,
and not as a prime-time program. Its command parsing, type checking, and symbol
table management are all very quick-and-dirty. For these reasons, its actual design is
not documented very much here.
{ "get", doget, "ooi",
"executes a Get query",
"usage: get <principal> <template> [<flags>] - queries <principal>\n" \
" for objects it has signed that match <template>. see sdsi.h\n" \
" for a listing of the possible bits in <flags>.\n" }
Figure 4-5: The sdsish command declaration for the get command.
However, one goal of sdsish was to make it very easy to add new commands
to it. The file sdsishcommands.c contains all of the functions that implement the
various shell commands. Every function that implements a command has the same
prototype: something * function-name(something *);
A something is the data structure used to pass values of many types within the
shell. A something can represent a SDSI object, SDSI list, SDSI octet-string, a
simple C string, or an integer. somethings can made into a linked list; this is how
multiple arguments are passed into a command function. Command functions option-
ally return a single something containing the result of the command. A something
indicates what type of thing it actually represents, then includes either a pointer to
or the actual value of that thing.
Adding a new command to the shell involves the following tasks:
1. Decide on the name for the new command, and the name of the C function that
will implement it. Add a new prototype declaration using the FUNC macro to
the top of sdsish_commands.c using the name of the new function.
2. Add a new command declaration to the commands array. commands is an initial-
ized array of type command - a data structure that holds a command declaration.
The command structure used to declare the get command is given in Figure 4-5
as an example. Its fields are:
(a) The name of the command.
(b) The name of the function implementing the command.
Table 4.1: sdsish command definition argument types.
(c) The command's argument list description. Its contents are described be-
low.
(d) A short explanation of the command.
(e) Full help for the command.
A command's argument list description is a string, where each character rep-
resents an argument indicating the type of something that argument must be.
Valid types are given Table 4.1. An o, 1, s, and i may be capitalized: this causes
a NULL object (or, in the case of an integer, the value zero) to be passed in as
the corresponding argument if none is specified on the command line - in other
words, a capitalized argument type specifies that the argument is optional.
3. Write the C function implementing the command. These functions are typically
short, since all most of them do is extract pointers to the different C structures
in the linked list of argument somethings passed in, hand them to a library
function, and package the return value back into a something. The function
implementing the shell's get command is a good example of this, and is shown
in Figure 4-6.










/* make the call: */
ret = newthing(NULL);
ret->thelist = sdsiexecutegetquery(P, template, flags);
ret->what = ALIST;
return(ret);
Figure 4-6: The sdsish command function do-get for the get command.
Appendix A
Building and Porting SDSI
This SDSI implementation was developed in C on Sun SPARCstations running SunOS
4.1.4, and compiled with GNU's gcc version 2.7.2. Since portability was another goal
while writing the library, server, and tools, this implementation should be fairly easy
to port to other architectures, operating systems, and compilers. The code should
be amenable to all Unix-like platforms, and (with the probable exception of the
networking code) should even be portable to a DOS/Windows environment.
In this appendix are a description of the implementation's source hierarchy, in-
structions on how to build it on its native SPARC/SunOS platform, and notes on
those parts that need to be modified in a port to another platform.
This appendix assumes the reader has already unpacked the SDSI distribution
into a local directory; throughout, whenever /base is used as part of an example
pathname, substitute for it the fully-qualified path to that directory.
A.1 The SDSI source tree
Starting from the root of the SDSI source tree at /base, this implementation is split
across five directories:
include This directory contains C header files that define the external (public) in-
terface to the SDSI library. There is no Makefile in this directory; however,
Section A.2 discusses the files that are constructed from library sources, and
Section A.3.1 describes how to port the platform-specific files.
lib This directory contains the C header files that define the internal (private) in-
terface to the SDSI library, the C code files that make up the library itself, and
other table files that are processed when building the library.
lib/crypto This directory contains the set of directories that hold the "third-party"
parts of the SDSI library: the cryptography modules. Since cryptography func-
tions tend to be unusually machine-specific, where the chosen modules came
from and their porting issues are covered in Section A.3.2.
sdsid This directory contains the C code file that is the SDSI object server.
tools This directory contains the C code files that are the SDSI support tools.
A.2 How to build the distribution
This is a step-by-step procedure for building the SDSI distribution just unpacked
from a tar file. It is assumed that the current platform is a SunOS 4.1 SPARC with
gcc, since the tar file contains the distribution configured to compile for that target.
1. Build the third party cryptography routines:
% cd /base/lib/crypto
% make all
This builds all of the objects in the md5, sha, des, idea, and gmp directories
under /base/lib/crypto. These objects will be added to libsdsi.a at the
end of the next step:
2. Build the library:
. cd /base/lib
% make all
This creates the SDSI library. It begins by building four files from two tables
in /base/lib. The tables are sdsi-words.table and sdsi.errors.table.
These tables contain C preprocessor symbol names and strings that they
are meant to correspond to, for the SDSI reserved words (Section 2.1.4)
and error codes (Section 2.1.5. The helper script make-table transforms
these into /base/include/sdsiwords.h and /base/lib/sdsiwords.c, and
/base/include/sdsierrors .h and /base/lib/sdsierrors. c, respectively.
The .h files contain numeric definitions for the preprocessor symbols, and the
.c files have a corresponding string array definition.
Then, it builds all of the objects in /base/lib from their C sources, and com-
bines those with the objects under /base/lib/crypto to make libsdsi.a.
3. Build the server:
K cd /base/sdsid
% make all
This builds the SDSI server sdsid from sdsid.c and libsdsi.a.
4. Build the support tools:
S cd /base/tools
% make all
This builds the SDSI tools pgp-to-sdsi, sdsi-cleanup-rebuild, and sdsish
from C sources and libsdsi. a.
A.3 How to port the distribution
The SDSI library, server, and tools were all written with portability in mind. While it
is generally impossible to create a large software distribution that will compile without
modification even within the Unix world, the SDSI library should be reasonably
portable.
All of the machine, operating system, and compiler dependencies that
the SDSI library itself has have been isolated in three different include
files: /base/include/sdsi-arch. h, /base/include/sdsi_os .h, and /base/lib/os_
lib.h, each discussed individually here.
Instructions on reconfiguring the third party cryptography routines, and an ex-
planation of how many of them are "glued" to and automatically use the library's
machine dependencies, are in the last section.
A.3.1 The platform-dependent header files
/base/include/sds iarch .h This is a C header file containing information about
the underlying machine's byte order and the specific C scalar types that it
provides, matching the SDSI library to the specific platform's hardware and
compiler. It contains definitions for C preprocessor symbols that describe the
machine's byte order, primitive integer types, and non-specific pointer and han-
dle types.
* Machine byte order is specified in the symbol SDSITYPE_32_BYTEORDER.
Its value is a 32-bit value, which, when stored as a 32-bit value on the
target machine, will store from lowest-address to highest-address the bytes
4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. For example, 0x4321 would specify normal
big-endian, and 0x1234 would specify normal little-endian.
* Many symbols' names take the form SDSI_TYPE.XYINT, and these are
used as names for types of specific size and signed-ness. Yis always either
S or U, to indicate a signed or unsigned type, respectively. When X is
a numeric value, it specifies the total size, in bits, of the type. The only
possible non-numeric values of X are NAT and FAT, which are used to specify
the "natural" value size of the architecture, and the largest ("fattest")
possible value size the architecture and compiler support.
* The non-specific pointer and handle types are defined in the symbols _
SDSITYPEVOIDPTR and _SDSITYPE_VOIDPTRPTR. These names betray
the fact that, on all modern systems, the void * and void ** types are
available for these purposes. On systems that do not allow pointers to
void, these symbol values should be char * and char **, respectively.
Currently, /base/include/sdsiarch .h is populated with SPARC definitions,
with some __GNUC--sensitive sections that introduce 64-bit integers (which are
available when using gcc, even on 32-bit native systems.)
/base/include/sdsios .h This is the second header file that continues to match
the SDSI library to a specific platform, but now to features of its operating
system and compiler. This file contains more C preprocessor symbols:
* The symbol INTERFACE is available to contain keywords that should be
present in declarations or prototypes of SDSI library interface functions.
This is to make those definitions conform to the calling convention that will
be used with the library. Under Unix systems, this symbol will be defined
with no value, since the calling convention is always fixed. However, when
porting the library to Windows, INTERFACE might be defined to be __.far
__export __pascal, so the SDSI library can correctly become a DLL.
* The symbol NOARGS controls what appears in the argument section of pro-
totypes and definitions of functions that take no arguments. On most
modern systems, this is void. On some older systems, this may have to
be empty.
* The symbol PROTOTYPE is a macro that controls how function prototypes
are built for the compiler. The macro takes one argument - the argument
list for the prototype. On compilers that support full prototypes (most
modern ones do) this macro simply expands into that argument. When
full prototypes are not supported, define this macro so that it expands into
nothing, and simple prototypes will always be emitted to the compiler.
Currently, sdsios.h is populated with definitions for Unix systems running
gcc.
/base/lib/osilib.h This is another header file that contains platform-specific def-
initions for the SDSI library, except, unlike /base/lib/sdsi_arch.h and
/base/lib/sdsi_os.h, it is private to the library - its definitions don't need to
ever be included as any part of the external library interface.
The C preprocessor definitions in this file currently only provide symbols that
name members of the operating system's equivalent of the Unix setjmp family.
setjmp functionality, which should be provided in all modern C runtime envi-
ronments, is needed for the catch-and-throw error handling facilities, which are
described in Section 2.2.
* The symbol JMP_BUF represents the name of the data structure that holds
a continuation. For Unix, this is just jmp.buf as defined in <setjmp.h>.
* The symbols SETJMP and LONGJMP map similarly to the names of functions
that store the current continuation and jump to a continuation. For Unix,
these map straight to setjmp and longjmp, respectively.
A.3.2 The cryptography routines
The compilation of cryptography routines is notoriously machine-dependent, because
these routines always have compute in a precise fashion, regardless of the platform's
byte order or native integer size.
There are five "third-party" cryptography modules contained in directories under
/base/lib/crypto. Each module falls into one of two categories: either it contains
a script or Makefile that takes care of configuring or compiling the module on the
current platform, or, in the case of the smaller modules, its header file has been
modified into a "glue" header file that gets information from the platform-dependent
library files of the previous section. These latter modules don't need any further
configuration in order to compile.
The five modules are:
des This is the popular libdes package written by Eric Young (eayQmincom.oz.au).
It is not glued to the SDSI library, but should compile on most Unix ma-
chines with gcc without any work. If compiling on a Unix without gcc, edit
/base/lib/crypto/Makefile to change the des: target to read make cc in-
stead of make gcc.
des/INSTALL does contain instructions on work that needs to be done to compile
this library on systems missing some runtime-environment support, or on 64-
bit systems such as the DEC Alpha. It also lists desirable make targets for
different Intel x86 platforms (making the library use its Intel assembly language
routines) - a chosen target name should replace the gcc in the des: target body
in /base/lib/crypto/Makefile.
gmp This directory holds the GNU multi-precision library, which is used to perform
RSA's modular exponentiation. It is not glued to the SDSI library, but makes
use of the popular GNU-ism configure.
The SDSI distribution comes with gmp conf igured for sparc-sun-sunos4.1.4.
To prepare gmp for compilation on another platform:
X cd /base/lib/crypto/gmp
% ./configure
idea This directory contains the IDEA encryption code, lifted straight from Phil
Zimmerman's pgp distribution. This module has been glued to the SDSI
machine-dependent header files, so no configuration of this module is neces-
sary. idea/idea.h, the glue header file, is a modified version of the original
idea.h.
md5 This directory contains RSA's reference implementation of MD5. Like the IDEA
module, this has been glued to the SDSI machine-dependent header files, so no
configuration of this module is necessary. md5/md5 .h, the glue header file, is a
modified version of the original md5.h.
sha This directory contains a implementation of SHA derivative of one found in
[11]. It has has been glued to the SDSI machine-dependent header files, so no
configuration of this module is necessary. sha/sha.h, the glue header file, is a
modified version of the original sha.h.
The glue header files are all modified versions of the original modules' header files,
with the normally hand-configurable machine-specific section replaced by sections
based on /base/include/sdsi.arch .h and /base/include/sdsi_os .h.
There are usually two such sections, chosen based on the presence of the C prepro-
cessor symbol _SDS I _CRYPTO.PRIMITIVES. When these header files are being included
by /base/lib/crypto-primitives.c, this symbol is defined, to select a set defini-
tions sufficient to mate the SDSI library to the module. When this symbol is not
defined, the header file is being included by the module itself for the purposes of its
own compilation, so definitions needed to mate the module to the SDSI library are
chosen instead.
Figure A-1 contains an example of the glue in sha/sha.h.




/* this glues SHA to us: */
typedef _SDSI_TYPE_8_UINT BYTE;
typedef _SDSI_TYPE_32_UINT LONG;
#if (_SDSITYPE_32_BYTEORDER != 0x4321)
#define LITTLEENDIAN
#endif
#else /* _SDSICRYPTOPRIMITIVES */
/* this glues us to SHA: */
#define BYTE _SDSI_TYPE_8_UINT
#define LONG _SDSITYPE_32_UINT




LONG digest[5]; /* message digest */
LONG count_lo, count_hi; /* 64-bit bit count */
LONG data[16]; /* SHA data buffer */
} SHAINFO;
void sha_init(SHAINFO *);
void shaupdate(SHA_INFO *, BYTE *, int);
void shafinal(SHA_INFO *);
void sha_stream(SHA_INFO *, FILE *);
void sha_print(SHA_INFO *);




#endif /* _SDSI_CRYPTOPRIMITIVES */
Figure A-1: The glue in the header file sha/sha.h.
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